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Ability to Repay: Mortgage Lending Standards After Dodd-Frank

I. INTRODUCTION
"People respond to incentives." Gregory Mankiw

Lenders pay brokers a percentage of the loan originated
and an additional percentage for including high profit or risky
features.2 Brokers can increase their income by originating more
loans, larger loans, and loans with riskier features.! A revenue
maximizing broker would attempt to include as many high risk
features as possible in the largest loan a borrower can afford and
make as many of these loans as possible. In the late 1990s
through the mid-2000s, securitization effectively eliminated risk to
lenders, and with the ability to pass risk on to investors came a
race to the bottom in underwriting standards.
On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was signed into law,
placing a number of requirements on lenders regarding mortgage
underwriting and lending practices.6 The most direct attack on
1. N. Gregory Mankiw, Mankiw's Ten Principles, SOUTH-WESTERN,
(last
http://www.swlearning.com/economics/mankiw/principles2e/principles.html
visited Feb. 13, 2011). Mankiw is an author of numerous economics texts and is
known for his ten "principles" of economics. About the Author, SOUTH-WESTERN,
http://www.swlearning.com/economics/mankiw/principles2e/author.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2011).
2. See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26country.html.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1292 (2009); cf. Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep
Sengupta, Where's the Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting
Standards for U.S. Subprime Mortgages 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working
Paper No. 2008-036D, 2008), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008036.pdf (finding that underwriting standards as measured by credit scores did not
decrease from 1998 through 2007. However, the article notes that bolstered credit
score requirements were often used to offset lower documentation requirements.).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1400-32, 124 Stat. 1376, 2136-63 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601
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irresponsible mortgage underwriting is in section 1411 where
Dodd-Frank sets forth basic financial information that lenders
must consider in extending mortgage loans.' These factors,
however, do not provide an adequate picture of a borrower's
likelihood of repayment, and section 1411 would better predict
loan default if additional metrics were included.8
Part II of this Note examines the rise of stated income
loans and the role they played in leading to the credit crisis. 9 Part
III is a brief examination of relevant portions of Dodd-Frank.o
Part IV evaluates the potential effectiveness of the factors listed in
Dodd-Frank, and Part V proposes two additional factors for
lenders to consider. Part VI concludes that while including loan
to value as a factor for consideration may be useful, it is not
contemplated by the text of Dodd-Frank.
II. THE RISE OF STATED INCOME LOANS

Stated income loans began as a product designed to
facilitate lending to individuals with difficult to document incomes:
those working on commission, the self-employed, individuals with
incomes that fluctuate from year-to-year, and other nontraditional borrowers." As these products were offered to more
borrowers, they earned the name "liar's loans" in industry circles
as the perception existed that some borrowers were inflating their
stated income to qualify for a loan. 4 In 2006, in some areas of the
country, one-half of new mortgages were of the stated income
variety.'5 Stated income loans were not confined to the subprime
et seq.).
7. Id. sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
& See infra Parts IV-V.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Parts IV-V.
12. See infra Part VI.
13. Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar's Loan: How the Mortgage Industry Nurtured
Deceit,SLATE (Apr. 24, 2008, 11:25 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2189576.
14. See Charles W. Murdock, Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and
the Economic Meltdown, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 801, 843-44 (2010) (reflecting the
tendency of loan applications to overstate borrower's income and assets).
15. Although only reaching this level in some parts of the country, this trend
encompassed both subprime and prime loans. Gimein, supra note 13.
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market, as lenders marketed them as products which allowed
borrowers to borrow more than they could qualify for based on an
accurate statement of their current income, relying instead on an
expectation of a future increase in income. A sample of loans
from Washington Mutual, a large lender that dealt heavily in
stated income loans, had an average credit score of 705," and yet,
only twelve percent of the loans were made based on documented
income; eighty-eight percent were stated income loans." Less than
a year into the life of these loans, eighteen percent were in
foreclosure and an additional seven percent in sixty-day default or
worse as compared to a usual thirty-day default rate of under one
percent for prime borrowers.19
In a system where lenders have to retain loans, lenders
have incentives to use responsible lending and thorough
However, the advent of
underwriting to keep risk low.20
securitization allowed lenders to immediately sell risky mortgages
and not only eliminated any direct incentive to responsibly
underwrite, but rewarded looser underwriting practices by
allowing the lender to originate more loans. 21 Both borrowers and
originators had incentives to misuse the stated income loan;
borrowers could secure a larger loan with the assurance of
refinancing once the property had appreciated and originators
22
would get a larger fee due to the loan type and amount.
The subprime lending trend peaked in 2006 with subprime
mortgages - many of which were stated income loans - accounting

for almost fifteen percent of the $10 trillion total mortgage debt by
the end of the year. 23 The economy rapidly turned, and by
October of 2007, foreclosures were ninety-four percent higher than
the previous year and major firms had lost "tens of billions of
16. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,569 (July
10, 2007).
17. See Eggert, supra note 5, at 1271 (indicating that 620 is the subprime cutoff
with scores above that qualifying borrowers for prime loans).
18. Gimein, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. See Eggert, supra note 5, at 1264-65.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 1286.
23. David Anderson, Year in Review 2007: The Subprime Lending Crisis,71 TEx.
B. J. 20, 20 (2008).
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dollars in subprime assets [previously] on their books." 24 In 2007,
Congress attempted to pass H.R. 3915 which would have provided
many similar provisions to Dodd-Frank; however, the bill only
passed the House of Representatives.! H.R. 3915 included many
of the same requirements instituted by Title XIV of Dodd-Frank
including a reasonable ability to repay standard and required
Additionally, an amendment to
income documentation.26
27
Regulation Z that took effect October 1, 2009 requires lenders to
verify the ability of borrowers to repay loans, but only applies to
"high cost loans."2 8
III. THE ACT
A.

Section 1411 Factors

Dodd-Frank provides in section 1411(a)(2) that "[i]n
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board,29 no creditor
may make a residential mortgage loan unless ... the consumer has
a reasonable ability to repay the loan .. . .. ,,o Although the Board
will ultimately issue regulations implementing the statute, the
Dodd-Frank lists seven factors creditors must consider in
determining a consumer's ability to repay a loan:

24. Id.
25. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-741, HOME MORTGAGES:
PROVISIONS IN A 2007 MORTGAGE REFORM BILL (H.R. 3915) WOULD STRENGTHEN
BORROWER PROTECTIONS, BUT VIEWS ON THEIR LONG-TERM IMPACT DIFFER

2

(2009) [hereinafter GAO].
26. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c), with GAO, supra note 25, at 2.
27. Regulation Z is the Federal Reserve Board issued regulation that implements
the Truth in Lending Act. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2010).
28. A "high cost loan" is one on which the annual percentage rate exceeds
Treasury security rates by a set amount or the points and fees paid are over eight
percent. David A. Wolfe, New HOEPA Rule, THAT CREDIT UNION BLOG (Jan. 12,
2010, 5:55 PM), http://thatcreditunionblog.wordpress.com/2010/01/12/new-hoeparule.
29. Although in amending the Truth in Lending Act the text of Dodd-Frank uses
"Board," rulemaking and enforcement authority is given to the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection. Dodd-Frank Act § 1400(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
30. Id. sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
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credit history, current income, expected income the
consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current
obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the residual
income the consumer will have after paying nonmortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations,
employment status, and other financial resources
other than the consumer's equity in the dwelling or
real property that secures repayment of the loan."
These requirements presumably are among the factors
responsible lenders already consider and in fact closely mirror the
minimum mortgage underwriting standards proposed by John
Dugan, then Comptroller of the Currency.32
In addition to these factors, when calculating a borrower's
ability to repay a lender must use a payment schedule that fully
amortizes the loan.33 In the case of nontraditional mortgages such
as interest-only loans, a lender must calculate repayment ability
with a payment schedule that amortizes the loan by the end of the
loan term.34 When making these calculations, a lender must use
third party information such as a borrower's IRS form W-2s, tax
returns, or pay stubs to verify income.3 ' This third party
documentation requirement eliminates the possibility of stated
income.
B.

Qualified Mortgages

If lenders do not wish to be subject to the ability to repay
requirements, they may choose to make "qualified mortgage"
loans which establish a presumption that a borrower has a
reasonable ability to repay.36 Although qualified mortgages are
31. Id. sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3).
32. John C. Dugan, Securitization, 'Skin-in-the-Game' Proposals,and Minimum
Mortgage Underwriting Standards, Remarks before the American Securitization

Forum 10 (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-13.pdf.
33. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1639c).
34. Id. sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(6)(A).
35. Id. sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(4).
36. Id. sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(1), (2)(A).
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exempted from the requirements of section 1411(a), section 1412
provides that a qualified mortgage must also be supported with
documentation of the income and assets used to qualify the
borrower for the loan." To be a "qualified mortgage," a loan must
be a standard fixed-rate loan3 that fully amortizes and is supported
by income documentation with points and fees under three percent
and a debt-to-income ratio under forthcoming guidelines.3 9 An
adjustable rate loan may also qualify if it adheres to these
requirements as well as being calculated at the maximum rate
possible for the first five years.40 A "qualified mortgage" also
exempts lenders from the requirement that they retain five percent
of the risk when selling mortgages in the secondary market.4 1
C.

Interpretationof "Ability to Repay"

While these changes represent a major step in federal
regulation of mortgage underwriting practices, nothing in DoddFrank imposes a suitability standard or fiduciary duty42 on brokers,
originators, or anyone in the lending process with respect to
borrowers. 43 The ordinary use of the word "ability" would indicate
that Congress wants lenders to calculate a borrower's capacity to
repay the loan given the terms of the loan and the borrower's
income." Given that most of the factors a borrower must consider
deal with income, employment, and debt burden, this could be a
fair assessment of Congress' interpretation of "ability." 45 During
37. Id. sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(A)(iii).
38. Id. sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (disallowing balloon loans, interest-only
loans, and loans with an increasing principal balance).
39. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(A)(iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
40. Id. sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(A)(v).
41. Id. sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)).
42. Suitability means the instrument is "suitable for your objectives, means and
even age." A fiduciary standard is a higher duty that would require the broker to act
in the borrower's best interest. See, e.g., David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers
Fail,FORBES.COM (June 24, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligentinvesting-brokers.html.
43. See Dodd-Frank Act (to be codified at scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
44. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 4 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ability as "the
capacity to perform an act or service").
45. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
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the subprime boom, consumers were extended loans that, given
their incomes and financial means, they would never be able to
repay, and eliminating these practices is certainly one effect of
requiring documentation. 4 6
Credit history, however, is notably different from the other
factors contemplated as it is retrospective and informs on the
borrower's repayment habits; credit history is summarized by the
credit score.47
Credit scoring uses a formula, usually that
developed by Fair Isaac and Co. to evaluate "payment history[,] . .
. amounts owed[,] .

.

. length of credit history[,] .

.

. new credit

[, and]

. .. types of credit used" in a single metric, also called a
FICO score.48 Lenders have adopted credit scores as a means of
measuring a borrower's riskiness or likelihood of repaying
obligations.49 However, such information only protects lenders as
it does not reflect on a borrower's actual ability to repay a loan.
The inclusion of credit history in Dodd-Frank suggests that the
term "ability" means something more akin to "likelihood," and
may suggest that these provisions are intended to protect the
financial industry from the risk of poor underwriting as much as
they are intended to protect borrowers from predatory lending.
Assuming these are the dual goals of Title XIV, mitigating risk by
looking at only loan characteristics would be impracticable as
more defaults are directly attributable to exogenous shocks than to
excessive debt, making proxy variables such as credit history
invaluable.o Additionally, more than pure financial calculations
can be considered in underwriting, and before the proliferation of

1639c).
46. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,569 (July
10, 2007).
47. See

generally

What's

in

your

FICO

score,

MYFICO,

http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/whatsinyourscore.aspx (last visited Feb. 13,
2011) (detailing the factors that go into determining a credit score).
48. Id.

49. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 5, at 1270.
50. Of the top five reasons for mortgage default, debt load was only cited in 19.8
percent of cases while reduction in income, unemployment, sickness, or marriage
issues cumulatively accounted for 52.2 percent of all defaults. See FED. HOUSING FIN.
AGENCY, FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGERS REPORT No. 5, at 5 (2009).
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exclusive "hard underwriting" practices during the crisis, lenders
would often consider factors that are not quantifiable."
IV. CURRENT FACTORS
Since the likelihood of repayment is not based entirely on
the sufficiency of financial means at origination, various borrower
and loan characteristics can be used to estimate the risk of a
Some, like credit score, represent a
borrower defaulting.
borrower's tendency to repay (or not repay) obligations, while
others measure the borrower's ability to weather exogenous
shocks. The following sections examine the usefulness of each of
the factors lenders must consider by looking at the feasibility of
documentation, and any correlation (or lack thereof) to a risk of
default.
A.

Credit Score

The FICO score is the predominant tool in the modern
mortgage industry for making initial assessments of a borrower's
risk profile. Lenders typically consider a score less than 620 to be
high-risk or subprime, a score between 620 and 660 to be suspect,
and a score over 660 as qualifying for prime loans.54 In the 1990s,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using credit scores to evaluate
borrowers and have adopted 620 as the bound for subprime loans;
the rest of the market has followed suit, although no justification
as has been advanced to explain why this cutoff was chosen.

51. Eggert, supra note 5, at 1275 (discussing the role of human judgment in the
decision to extend credit).
52. See, e.g., Lucy Delgadillo & Amber Gallagher, Borrower- and MortgageRelated FactorsAssociated With FHA Foreclosures, 34 FAM. & CONSUMER SCI. RES.
J. 204, 206 (2006) (stating that various borrower and loan characteristics are known to
correlate with default risk).
53. David M. Harrison et al., Do Riskier BorrowersBorrow More?, 32 REAL EST.
ECON. 385, 402 (2004).
54. Id.; see also Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics
of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 43 n.68 (2009) (discussing the 620 credit
score cutoff for prime loans).
55. Harrison et al., supra note 53, at 402; see also Zywicki & Adamson, supra
note 54, at 43 n.68 (discussing the lack of justification for the 620 credit score cutoff
for prime loans).
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Comparing the relative default rate of loans grouped by
FICO score has generally lead to the conclusion that a lower score
leads to an increased risk of default. 6 In a 2007 study, the
Government Accountability Office conducted an analysis of four
different nonprime loan products with respect to compliance with
the stalled precursor to Title XIV (GAO Study).5 7 For each loan
product, the default probability for a credit score in the 75th
percentile was compared to the default probability for a credit
58
The two products showing the
score in the 25th percentile.
largest increases in default probability also had the lowest 25th
percentile credit scores.5 9 The greatest increase in default
probability was associated with short-term hybrid adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs) which were the only product where the 25th
percentile score was below the 620 threshold, but also had an
initial default probability much higher than the other products.
The other two products, while showing a smaller increase, still
showed a relationship between decreasing credit scores and
increasing likelihood of default.
In a study of mortgages issued in New York City,
researchers compared the default risk of mortgages made to
borrowers with FICO scores over 720 to the risk of those made to
all other borrowers, grouped by credit score.62 For both ARMs
and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), as the credit score declined, the

56. Sewin Chan et al., The Role of Neighborhood Characteristics in Mortgage
Default Risk: Evidence from New York City 30 (June 29, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/working-paper.pdf; GAO, supra note 25, at
32; Yuliya Demyanyk, Did Credit Scores Predict the Subprime Crisis?,REGIONAL
ECONOMIsT 12, 13 (Oct. 2008).
57. GAO, supra note 25, at 27.
58. Id. at 32.
59. The short-term hybrid ARMs showed a 7.3% point increase when moving
from a 675 score to a 600 score, and the FRMs showed a 5.5% increase going from a
725 score to a 625 score. Id. at 34.
60. Short-term hybrid ARMs had an initial probability of 13.3 percentage points
as compared to initial probabilities ranging from 2.5 to 4.5 percentage points for the
other products. Id. at 34.
61. Long-term ARMs showed a 3.3% increase when moving from a 750 to 675
score, and payment-option ARMs showed a 2.1% increase in the same score range.
Id. at 34.
62. Chan et al., supra note 56, at tbls.4, 6.
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risk of default increased. Interestingly, for ARMs, the only range
of credit scores where default risk did not significantly increase
was from the 620-650 range to the 590-620 range." This is
counterintuitive as 620 is often the divide between lower risk
prime borrowers and higher risk subprime borrowers.6 5 One
explanation for the discontinuity is the difficulty in selling and
securitizing loans below 620, thus lenders had an incentive to more
thoroughly underwrite and verify loan applications since they
would be retaining the risk on these loans.
Some recent research has challenged the accuracy of FICO
scores in predicting subprime or prime mortgage defaults in
changing market conditions.67 As the subprime crisis continued,
the percentage of mortgages in serious delinquency across all
credit scores rose dramatically with the largest proportional
increases being among those borrowers with the highest credit
scores.6
The data presented shows delinquency rates for
borrowers with a score of over 700 almost quadrupling from under
3% to around 11% while delinquency rates for borrowers with
scores in the 500-600 range nearly doubled going from just over
10% to just over 20%.69 The 2007 delinquency rate for those in the
top bracket was the same as the 2005 delinquency rate of
borrowers in the bottom bracket of scores.
While the disproportionate increase is problematic for
FICO-based predictions of risk, the absolute difference between
the delinquency rates of the lowest and highest credit scores stands
at ten percentage points, which indicates that although borrowers
63. For ARMs, the default risk of a borrower with a FICO score less than 530,
the lowest range considered, is ninety percent greater than a borrower with a score
over 720. For FRMs, the increase is on the order of 500%. See id. But see Yuliya
Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understandingthe Subprime Mortgage Crisis,REV.
FINANC. STUD. 7 (2009), availableat
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/contentlearly/2009/05/04/rfs.hhp033 (indicating that
FRMs are much less common in the subprime market).
64. Chan et al., supra note 56, at tbl.4.
65. Harrison et al., supra note 53, at 402.
66. Mike Konczal, Doing the Homework, RORTYBOMB (Apr. 27, 2009),
http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2009/04/27/doing-the-homework.
67. Demyanyk, supra note 56, at 13.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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with high FICO scores were defaulting at a higher rate, they were
still less risky than borrowers with lower scores in the same year.71
One explanation for the disproportionate increase in defaults by
borrowers in the highest FICO range is that by the later years of
the crisis, loans with historically subprime features were
increasingly offered to borrowers with credit scores that would
qualify for a prime loan.n
Although the studies seem conclusive in indicating that an
increase in FICO score correlates with a decrease in default
probability, the discontinuity in the default rate at the subprime
cutoff73 and disproportionate responsiveness of high FICO scores
to declining markets 74 indicate that the correlation is subject to the
influence of confounding variables. At best, FICO scores seem
capable of providing valuations of borrower risk as compared to
other borrowers at a particular time, but they offer no absolute
valuation of a borrower's risk or a borrower's responsiveness to
market conditions.75
B.

Debt-to-Income Ratio

The term "debt-to-income"(DTI) ratio is used to refer to
the "back-end ratio" of a loan, or the sum of the monthly
mortgage payment and all other recurring non-mortgage debt
divided by monthly income. According to industry regulators, a
borrower's DTI ratio is a crucial consideration in making a loan
because it determines whether sufficient income remains for living
expenses. Currently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require that

71. This data does not control for differences in mortgages based on FICO score,
thus some or all of the difference between high FICO default rate and low FICO
default rate may be explained by different loan products offered to these groups. Id.
72. Gimein, supra note 13.
73. Chan et al., supra note 56, at tbl.4; Konczal, supra note 65.
74. Demyanyk, supra note 56, at 13.
75. See id. (finding a disproportionate increase in default rate of high credit score
loans during the credit crisis).
76. See, e.g., Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 63, at 9 tbl.2 (defining debtto-income ratio); Delgadillo & Gallagher, supra note 52, at 209 (defining front-end
and back-end ratio).
77. GAO, supra note 25, at 21-22.
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loans exceeding a DTI of forty-five percent be re-underwritten,
and the FHA places a forty-one percent hard cap on a borrower's
DTI ratio. 9 The FHA also places a similar cap on a borrower's
"front-end ratio," the total monthly mortgage payment divided by
monthly income, of twenty-nine percent.8
Some recent research indicates that a 45 percent DTI
standard may be effective in curtailing risky mortgages. 1 Of all
the securitized subprime ARMs originated in New York City from
2004 through 2007, those over a DTI of 45 percent were 13 percent
more likely to default than those with a DTI of less than 45
Similarly, securitized subprime FRMs made to
percent.82
borrowers over a 45 percent DTI were 10 percent more likely to
default than securitized subprime FRM borrowers with a DTI less
than 45 percent."3 This analysis renders little information about
the nature of the correlation between DTI ratio and risk of default
as it merely compares those groups on either side of a certain
benchmark.Y
A random sample of all securitized nonprime mortgages
originated between 2000 and 2006 showed a weak positive
correlation between DTI and the risk of default.5
This is
consistent with the data from New York as a weak correlation,
although not well approximated by an equation, would show a
generally increasing trend that would be evident in comparing the
upper and lower half of a sample." Some difference between these
78. News Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Clarifies Undisclosed Liabilities
Policy: Company Describes When Re-Underwriting is Necessary (Aug. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2010/5126.jhtml [hereinafter
Fannie Mae News Release]; FREDDIE MAC, LOAN PROSPECTOR DOCUMENTATION
MATRIX 19 (Oct. 2010), http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/docmatrix.pdf.
79. FHA Requirements: Debt Ratios, FHA,
http://www.fha.com/fharequirementsdebt.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
80. The FHA definition of total monthly mortgage payment includes such things
as insurance, payments into escrow for taxes, and payments to homeowners'
associations. Id.
81. Chan et al., supra note 56, at 17, 43 tbl.6.
82. Id. at 17.
83. Id. at 43 tbl.6.
84. Id. at 17, 43 tbl.6.
85. GAO,supra note 25, at 30.
86. See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICS IN THE LAw 34 (2009) (noting that the closer a correlation coefficient is to
one, the closer the data matches an increasing line and a weak correlation can
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two studies may be explained by differences in sample selection.
The study of New York City mortgages, although analyzing
seventy-eight percent of its sample, was geographically restricted
and limited to originations from 2004 to 2007. The GAO data set
was a nationwide sample of securitized nonprime mortgages which
spanned a longer time frame." Additionally, the GAO study only
had complete data for sixty-three percent of its sample.89
Irrespective of the difference in sampling and methodology, both
studies showed an average DTI ranging from approximately thirtythree percent to forty-two percent for the various loan products
evaluated."
While both of these studies analyzed the correlation
between the back-end ratio and default risk, an analysis of 179
FHA loans originated in Utah between 2000 and 2001 estimated
the impact of a borrower's front-end ratio as well. 9' This study
found a weak correlation between front-end ratio and default risk
but no correlation between DTI and default risk." Although these
results do not square exactly with other findings, it may be due to
the lack of variation in DTI ratios in this particular sample.93 The
lack of variation in DTI ratios but wide range of front-end ratios
would seem to indicate that borrowers with less recurring nonmortgage debt at origination were more likely to default. 94 This

indicate a meaningful relationship).
87. Chan et al., supra note 56, at 2, 7, 9.
88. GAO,supra note 25, at 45.
89. Id. at 56.
90. Chan et al., supra note 56, at 36 tbl.1; GAO,supra note 25, at 53-56.
91. Delgadillo & Gallagher, supra note 52, at 211-12.
92. Id. at 214.
93. The mean back-end ratio is 38.53 with a standard deviation of .07, whereas
the mean front-end ratio is 29.42 with a standard deviation of 7.25. The relatively
small standard deviation for the back-end ratio indicates that most of the samples are
clustered around the mean value. The lack of a similar clustering for front-end ratios
may have to do with the characteristics of FHA borrowers or other confounding
variables. See id. at 215.
94. The data indicate that most borrowers had total debt obligations of
approximately thirty-nine percent of their income. For sixty-eight percent of
borrowers, the portion of that debt that was mortgage related varied from twenty-two
to thirty-six percent. Additionally, sixteen percent of borrowers would have had
mortgage debt that was less than twenty-two percent of their income while the other
sixteen percent would have had mortgage debt over thirty-six percent of their
income. See id.

304

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 15

may be a failing of lenders to estimate non-mortgage debt the
borrowers have not yet incurred but are likely to (e.g. car
payments), an indication of a sensitivity of FHA borrowers to a
higher proportion of mortgage debt, or some unexplained factor.
The forty-one percent cap placed on DTI ratios by the FHA' may
also explain the lack of correlation if DTI variation up to that
amount has little impact on a consumer's default probability.
Nevertheless, there is a correlation between debt load and
default risk.96 It is perhaps best dealt with in the manner currently
in use by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) - a cap in the
The evidence from FHA loans
vicinity of forty-five percent.
suggests that such a cap is effective at reducing the risk of default.
Confining borrowers to manageable debt burdens with such a cap
would all but eliminate any predictive value associated with DTI
since a correlation only exists above this cap."
This factor also includes a provision that a lender may
consider DTI "or the residual income the consumer will have after
paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations."'00
This provision will likely only affect those with very high or very
low monthly incomes. For those with high monthly income, a DTI
approaching or over the usual threshold may not be a serious
constraint as there is still ample income or liquidity remaining for
monthly expenditures or unplanned expenses. On the other end of
the spectrum, those with very low monthly incomes may require a
greater proportion of their income to cover living expenses and
emergencies and thus should be more closely scrutinized when
seeking a high DTI ratio.

95. FHA Requirements: Debt Ratios, supra note 79.
96. See supra pp. 301-04.
97. Fannie Mae News Release, supra note 78; Loan ProspectorDocumentation
Matrix,supra note 78.
98. Delgadillo & Gallagher, supra note 52, at 219.
99. Id. at 219.
100. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 2143 (2010) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
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CurrentIncome/Current Obligations

The calculation of DTI includes both income and nonmortgage obligations,'01 thus the requirement that lenders evaluate
current income and obligations is superfluous.0 A study of FHA
loans from 1992 and 1994 showed no correlation between
individual borrower income and default risk.'03 Some empirical
and theoretical evidence supports the contention that if there is
any relation between income and default risk, it is either a bimodal
or inverse correlation as the costs associated with default are
higher in proportion to a lower income borrower's income.
Absent use in the DTI ratio, there seems to be little use for income
or obligations in calculating ability to repay.'as Even if substantial
evidence of a correlation between income and default risk did
exist, Community Reinvestment Act obligations would make these
factors difficult or impossible to consider.'os

101. See, e.g., FREDDIE MAC, A CLOSER LOOK AT UNDERWRITING BORROWER
CAPACITY (2009), availableat
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/uw/docs/A-closerlookatunderwriting-bo
rrowerscapacity_837.pdf.
102. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1639c).
103. ROBERT

F.

COTrERMAN,

U.S.

DEP'T OF HoUS.

AND

URBAN

DEV.,

NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS INMORTGAGE DEFAULT RISK 28 (2001).
104. Robert Van Order & Peter Zorn, Income, Location and Default: Some
Implications for Community Lending, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 385, 390 tbl.2, 395-96

(2000) (showing the highest default probability for those borrowers in the highest
income range, lower default probabilities for those borrowers in mid-range income
brackets, and the default probability for the lowest income borrowers approaching
that of the wealthiest borrowers. The article proposes default costs are the reason for
the observed distribution.); David Streitfeld, Biggest Defaulters on MortgagesAre the

Rich, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at Al ("More than one in seven homeowners with
loans in excess of a million dollars are seriously delinquent . .. [whereas] [a]bout one
in 12 mortgages below the million-dollar mark is delinquent.").
105. See COTrERMAN, supra note 103, at 28; Van Order & Zorn, supra note 103, at

395; Streitfeld, supra note 103 (supporting the proposition that no clear correlation
exists between current income and default risk).
106. The Community Reinvestment Act requires that lenders are evaluated by
lending patterns with respect to borrower income. If low income was treated as a risk
factor, lenders may not be able to make satisfactory ratings under the evaluation
system imposed by the Community Reinvestment Act. 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(3)(i)
(2010).
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Employment/Expected Income

Presumably, the intent of this provision is to assure that the
borrower will be able to continue making loan payments in the
foreseeable future. However, beyond ensuring a job is not
seasonal or inaccurately portrayed,0 7 there seems to be little
predictive use for either of these metrics.
Lenders and attorneys have already raised a number of
potential questions about how a lender can document that a
consumer is "reasonably assured of receiving"to a certain level of
income.109 In a poor economic climate, a borrower who works for
a company in the midst of rounds of layoffs may not meet the
standard.no Other issues may lie in proving a borrower is capable
of making a balloon payment at the end of a loan period,' or
documenting expected income that is based largely on
discretionary bonuses or commissions.'
V. PROPOSED FACTORS

Given the shortcomings discussed above, Dodd-Frank is
essentially only mandating three considerations for lenders: a
credit check, an acceptable DTI, and a verification of the
borrower's employment.
Given that credit score is the only
107. See, e.g., Jeff Horwitz & Kate Berry, A No-Doc Paradoxat Center Of Many
GSE-Lender Tussles, AM. BANKER, Aug. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16113408
(discussing hourly wage earners applying for mortgages in excess of $500,000 at the
height of the crisis).
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 2143 (2010) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
109. KRISTIE D. KULLY ET AL., K&L GATES, THE SENATE MOVES TO REFORM
MORTGAGE LOAN ORIGINATION AND UNDERWRITING PRACTICES 4 (May 19, 2010),
available at http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=6428; JOSEPH
BARLOON ET AL., SKADDEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS IN THE DODDFRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION Acr 6 (July 9, 2010),

available
at
http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSRA ConsumerProtectionProvisionsin_
Dodd-Frank.pdf; Stuart Saft, Viewpoint: Anti-PredatorAct? It's More Anti-Lender,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 17340241.
110. KULLY ET AL., supra note 109, at 4.
111. BARLOON ET AL., supra note 109, at 6.
112. Saft, supra note 109.
113. See supra Part IV.

2011]

ABILITY TO REPAY

307

factor with significant predictive value,114 prudential underwriting
should likely include other considerations. Research and industry
practice indicate that loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and the interest
rate charged are highly correlated with risk of default and should
therefore be considered for inclusion. "
A.

Loan-to-Value Ratio

An increase in loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is consistently
correlated with an increase in delinquency. 16 However, this does
not mean that LTV is necessarily a good predictor of ultimate
defaults." A high LTV places a borrower in a position where a
small drop in home prices may put the borrower in a negative
equity situation; as long as default costs are not prohibitively high,
rational borrowers with negative equity should choose to default."8
Although the GAO study determined that for all categories of
subprime loan products moving from the twenty-fifth percentile
LTV to seventy-fifth percentile LTV resulted in an increase in the
default rate,"9 the strength of this claim is tempered by the fact
that the study defined "default" to include loans in ninety-day
delinquency.120
Two models have been advanced as to how LTV affects
default rates.12 1 The more basic of the two states that while LTV
may be a modest indicator of loan default, current loan-to-value
114. See supra Part IV.A.
115. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 25, at 32-33 (finding a correlation between LTV
and default risk as well as a correlation between interest rate spread and default risk).
116. Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of
Subprime Mortgages, 60 J. OF ECON. AND Bus. 67, 71, 77 (2008) (finding a correlation
between delinquent loans and high LTVs at origination and citing previous work with
similar findings).
117. See id. at 77 (finding no connection between a high LTV and default. The
authors conclude that a high LTV at origination indicates a propensity to miss
payments and enter delinquency without losing the home in default).
118. Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 63, at 20.
119. GAO, supra note 25, at 32-33 (noting that short-term hybrid ARMs, longterm ARMs, payment-option ARMs, and FRMs showed default rate increases of 4.4,
4.7, 6.3, and 3.7 percentage points).
120. Id. at 50.
121. See Chan et al., supra note 56, at 17 (noting that default is correlated with
current loan to value); Harrison et al., supra note 53, at 408 (finding that default rate
is dependent on an interaction between LTV and "default cost").
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ratio (CLTV) is a more accurate predictor of loan performance as
the loan term progresses.122 This reduces the effectiveness of LTV
at origination as a predictor of default risk, but it may still have
some value predicting the success of loans proximate to origination
as the GAO study shows."3 Additionally, if lenders have
information or strong beliefs about falling house prices in an area,
higher LTVs are riskier due to the fact that it takes less price
fluctuation for strategic default to become an economically
optimal choice.124
A more complex model suggests that the presence of
default costs confounds what would otherwise be a clearer
correlation between LTV and default risk.125 The study posits a
model where riskier borrowers'26 self-select into lower LTV ratios
in the presence of significant default costs and thus raise the
default rate of loans originated with low LTVs.127 Although
default costs encompass a variety of actual material and nonmaterial costs, the most readily observable default cost is damage
to a borrower's credit score, with those having the most to lose
located immediately above the subprime range, from 620-660.128
The study finds that borrowers in this range do behave as the
model predicts with riskier borrowers consistently having lower
LTVs than lower risk borrowers. 129

122. The study found that the default risk for ARMs with a CLTV over ninety was
double that of similar loans with a CLTV under sixty. Similarly, FRMs showed a
default risk two and a half times as large for loans with a CLTV over ninety as
compared to loans with a CLTV under sixty. Chan et al., supra note 56, at 17, 23.
123. GAO, supra note 25, at 32-33 (showing a correlation between LTV and
default risk for loans within twenty-four months from origination).
124. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 63, at 20 (explaining that when
LTV is sufficiently high, the costs of keeping the mortgage outweigh the costs of
default).
125. See Harrison et al., supra note 53, at 408.
126. Id. at 403 (defining risky borrowers as those with high DTI ratios or the selfemployed).
127. Id. at 399, 407-08.
128. Id. at 402.
129. When default costs are high, self-employed borrowers have LTVs 12.1
percentage points lower than those of borrowers that are not self-employed.
Similarly, with high default costs, borrowers with high debt have LTVs 26.4
percentage points lower than those with low debt. Both of these distinctions are
erased in low default cost scenarios. Id. at 405-6.
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If this model remains accurate,13 a requirement of
heightened scrutiny on borrowers immediately above the subprime
range may help better assess the risk. In theory, any loan sold to
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac already receives such scrutiny if the
borrower's credit score is close to 620,13' but currently lenders are
restricting their purchases of loans with credit scores under 640.132
However, regardless of the accuracy of this particular model,
lenders behave as if increased LTVs are correlated with increased
default risks.133 Given the apparent interpretation of "ability to
repay"'134 as something more akin to "likelihood of repaying," LTV
is an appropriate metric to include in assessing potential
borrowers.
Some groups have raised issues with the use of LTV in
connection with qualified mortgage safe harbor requirements.
Imposing a LTV requirement would necessitate that borrowers
advance a down payment for any home purchase in order to
qualify for the safe harbor. 3 6 Such a down payment requirement
would reduce the access of less wealthy, otherwise creditworthy
3
This consideration may be why
borrowers to mortgage lending.1'
LTV has been left out of the ability to repay factors.

130. The loan data used are from loan originations in 1989, 1990, and 1991 and
may be less applicable to current market structure. Id. at 399.
131. Harrison et al., supra note 53, at 402.
132. Jody Shenn & John Gittelsohn, Home Buying Gets Tougher as Lenders
2:41
PM),
2010,
(Nov.
17,
BLOOMBERG
FHA
Loans,
Restrict

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/home-ownership-gets-harder-foramericans-as-lenders-restrict-fha-mortgages.html (noting that two large lenders
recently raised the minimum credit score for an FHA loan to 640).
133. Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 63, at 25.
134. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
135. Letter from AFL-CIO et al. to Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y, Dep't of the
Treas., et al. (Jan. 25,2011), availableat http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgagelending/policy-legislation/regulators/QRM-Letter-Consumer-Civil-Rights-Labor.pdf
(having also been signed by Americans for Financial Reform, Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, NAACP, National Association of Neighborhoods, National Council
of La Raza, National Fair Housing Alliance Union, National People's Action, Service
Employees International Union, Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Action,
National Association of Consumer Advocates, and National Consumer Law Center).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Interest Rate

The loan spread, the difference between a borrower's rate
and the best rate offered on the market, may serve as another
signal of the probability of default."8 The GAO Study found that
for three categories of subprime loan products moving from the
twenty-fifth percentile loan spread to seventy-fifth percentile loan
spread resulted in an increase in the default rate for each
139
product. Similarly, a study of FHA loans found that there was a
"moderately strong" correlation between default rate and the
interest rate of the loan.'4 Two theories emerge to explain the
correlation of higher mortgage rates and increased default.
Lenders would wholly explain the relationship as an intentional
effort to make lending to higher risk borrowers profitable.14 1 If this
is the case, assessing a borrower's ability to repay a loan by
measuring the interest rate would be redundant as the interest rate
itself is wholly a measure of risk.142
A second theory recognizes the relationship between risk
and return, but since increasing the interest rate on a loan
increases payment amounts, loans with higher rates are more
difficult to pay off.143 Essentially, in a subprime loan "the seller's
attempt to compensate for risk of default increases the very risk at
issue."'" Under this theory, merely having a high mortgage rate is
not predictive; the relevant statistic is the mark-up from the prime
rate. 145 Two problems then arise in the usefulness of interest rate
in predicting default: its limitation to riskier borrowers purchasing
subprime products'" and the fairly strict curtailment of loan spread
138. GAO, supra note 25, at 29; Delgadillo & Gallagher, supra note 52, at 214.
139. GAO, supra note 25, at 29 (noting that short-term hybrid ARMs, long-term
ARMs, & FRMs showed default rate increases of 4.0, 1.8, & 2.6 percentage points).
140. Delgadillo & Gallagher, supra note 52, at 214.
141. See id. at 219 (discussing higher rates as premiums charged to riskier
borrowers).
142. Id.
143. See L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown, 51 CHALLENGE

40, 46 (2008).
144. Eggert, supra note 5, at 1272.
145. Wray, supra note 143, at 46.
146. Prime loans should experience comparatively little loan spread. See Eggert,
supra note 5, at 1272 (noting that increased interest rates are compensation for the
increased risk inherent in subprime loans).
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under Dodd-Frank by setting a maximum loan spread for
''qualified mortgages" and lower minimum spread that makes a
loan a "high cost mortgage." 47
VI. CONCLUSION

The factors a lender must consider in underwriting a home
mortgage loan under Dodd-Frank provide limited information on
loan performance.'" Credit scores only provide information on
relative risks in a given year, DTI is not predictive when under the
FHA and GSE caps, and the remainder of the factors, while
important to verify, do not have any predictive utility. 14 9 A more
complete analysis of likelihood of default should include
consideration of the LTV and any significant loan spread as both
of these factors have been shown to reflect an increased risk of
default.5 o Although the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
has some discretion in issuing regulations to implement the new
legislation, the factors listed in section 1411 cannot realistically be
construed as including either LTV or interest rate spread.'
Nevertheless, mandated metrics can only provide a finite amount
of assistance in predicting a borrower's likelihood of meeting
mortgage payments, and a return to a mixture of "soft" and "hard"
underwriting practices could help account for difficult to quantify
variables associated with mortgage lending decisions.'52
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147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(C)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 2147 (2010) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c) (setting a maximum loan spread for a mortgage to be classified
as a "qualified mortgage"); id. sec. 1431(a), § 1602(aa)(1)(A)(i)(I) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)) (setting the threshold for qualifying a mortgage as a "high cost
mortgage").
148. See supra Part IV.
149. See supra Part IV.
150. See supra Part V.

151. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(3) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1639c).
152. Eggert, supra note 5, at 1272-73.

